Sbrogna v. Sbrogna, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 639 (2018)
This court concluded that for purposes of the alimony reform act, G. L. c. 208, § 48 (act) (defining the phrase "length of the marriage" as "the number of months from the date of legal marriage to the date of service of a complaint or petition for divorce or separate support"), the relevant pleading (i.e., complaint or petition) is the one upon which the judgment of divorce absolute ultimately entered [641-643]; accordingly, the legally relevant pleading in a divorce action was the parties' joint petition under G. L. c. 208, § 1A, filed more than twenty years after they were married (rather than an earlier complaint filed by the husband under G. L. c. 208, § 1B), and the husband's modification complaint was properly dismissed [643]; finally, this court stated that the irregularity in the language of the act referring to the "date of service" of a joint petition under G. L. c. 208, § 1A (for which service is not required) did not affect the validity of the act, given that the reference could be read as merely a casual turn of phrase. [643]
This court concluded that for purposes of the alimony reform act, G. L. c. 208, § 48 (act) (defining the phrase "length of the marriage" as "the number of months from the date of legal marriage to the date of service of a complaint or petition for divorce or separate support"), the relevant pleading (i.e., complaint or petition) is the one upon which the judgment of divorce absolute ultimately entered [641-643]; accordingly, the legally relevant pleading in a divorce action was the parties' joint petition under G. L. c. 208, § 1A, filed more than twenty years after they were married (rather than an earlier complaint filed by the husband under G. L. c. 208, § 1B), and the husband's modification complaint was properly dismissed [643]; finally, this court stated that the irregularity in the language of the act referring to the "date of service" of a joint petition under G. L. c. 208, § 1A (for which service is not required) did not affect the validity of the act, given that the reference could be read as merely a casual turn of phrase. [643]